

EMN Annual Conference

6 October 2021




**EU large-scale IT systems
for migration and security
- Governance tool for migration
management and their impact on
fundamental rights**

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The landscape

Figure 1: EU and national IT systems in the area of justice and home affairs














Note: *Planned systems in italics*


Source: FRA (2017)


EU IT system	Main purpose	Persons covered	Biometric identifiers	Applicability
Eurodac	Determining the state responsible for examining an application for international protection	Applicants and beneficiaries of international protection	Fingerprints	27 EUMS + SAC
	Additional purpose: law enforcement	Migrants who crossed the external borders irregularly		
VIS	Facilitating the exchange of data between Schengen Member States on visa applications	Visa applicants and sponsors	Fingerprints and Facial image	24 EUMS (not CY, HR, IE) + SAC
	Additional purpose: law enforcement			
SIS	Facilitating law enforcement cooperation to safeguard security in the EU and Schengen Member States	Missing, vulnerable and wanted persons	Fingerprints, palm prints, facial image, DNA profile	25 EUMS (not CY, IE) + SAC
SIS – border checks	Entering and processing alerts for the purpose of refusing entry into or stay in the Schengen Member States	Third-country nationals convicted or suspected of an offence subject to custodial sentence of at least 1 year	Fingerprints, palm prints, facial image	25 EUMS (not CY, IE) + SAC
		Migrants in an irregular situation		
SIS – return	Entering and processing alerts on third-country nationals subject to a return decision	Migrants in an irregular situation subject to a return decision	Fingerprints, palm prints, facial image	25 EUMS (not CY, IE) + SAC
EES	Calculating and monitoring the duration of authorised stay of third-country nationals and identifying overstayers	Third-country national travellers coming for a short-term stay	Fingerprints, facial image	24 EUMS (not CY, HR, IE) + SAC
ETIAS	Pre-travel assessment of whether or not a visa-exempt third-country national poses a security, irregular migration or public health risk	Travellers coming from visa-free third countries	None	26 EUMS (not IE) + SAC
ECRIS-TCN	Sharing information on previous convictions of third-country nationals	Third-country nationals with a criminal record	Fingerprints, facial image	25 EUMS (not DK, IE)
EIS	Storing and querying data on serious international crime and terrorism	Persons suspected or convicted of serious organised crime and terrorism	Fingerprints, facial image, DNA profile	27 EUMS


Biometrics in the EU large-scale IT systems

   	  	 		None
SIS - police	SIS II- borders SIS II - return	EES ECRIS-TCN VIS Interoperability (CIR) <i>Eurodac recast</i>	Eurodac	ETIAS

 Fingerprint

 Facial image

 Palm prints


 DNA profile

Black = regulation adopted


Blue = regulation not adopted

Interoperability

Regulation (EU) 2019/817 & Regulation (EU) 2019/818




Interoperability (in practice)




Fundamental rights benefits

- **Right to liberty and security:** prevention of identity fraud and theft.
- **Right of the child:** enhanced protection for missing and abducted children, particularly if databases are interconnected.
- **Right to asylum:** help establishing the identity of asylum seekers without travel documents, if previously registered in some databases.



Key fundamental rights risks- EU IT systems & their interoperability



- **Purpose limitation**
 - ❑ Risks of '**function creep**', unauthorised access, unauthorised sharing
- **Data accuracy – biometric reliability?**
 - ❑ **Fingerprints reliability** decreases over time (older people, children)
 - ❑ **Limited experience with face recognition** (children ≠ adults, discriminatory impact?)
 - ❑ **False matches**: serious consequences for the individuals concerned and their rights.
 - ❑ **Difficulties to rebut a false assumption and correct the data.**
- **Non-discrimination**
 - ❑ Risk of profiling when decisions are taken based on algorithms, ex: ETIAS screening rules.

Data transfers to third parties & the right to asylum

Under watchful eyes: biometrics, EU IT systems and fundamental rights

Table 12: Purposes allowing sharing data with third countries in existing and planned EU IT systems

Eurodac Regulation and proposal	VIS	SIS II Decision and police	SIS II Regulation and borders	SIS II return	EES Regulation	ETIAS	ECRIS-TCN	Interop. proposals (CIR and MID)
For return purposes	For return purposes	No, only by Europol and Eurojust with the consent of the Member State who issued the alert, and by Interpol for checking against Interpol databases (SLTD), under certain conditions.	No, only by Europol with the consent of the Member State who issued the alert	For return purposes	For return purposes	No, only for checking against Interpol databases (SLTD and TDawn)	No, only by addressing Eurojust who will contact the Member State holding information	No

Sharing information with country of origin on asylum applicants: possible protection risks

Note: Proposed systems and proposed changes in italics.

Source: FRA, based on existing and planned legislative instruments (2017)

Fundamental Rights Safeguards


- **Law enforcement access: only for specific purpose and under strict conditions.**
- **Data subjects rights:** right to information, right to access, correction and deletion, right to an effective remedy
- **Human control** of automated decisions.
- **Prohibition of transfer of personal data** of asylum applicants to third countries.

Key take away/messages

1. Potential fundamental rights benefits and challenges of the processing of biometric data.
2. High trust in the systems which contain biometric data, but data quality concerns affecting rights.
3. False matches do not necessarily mean identity fraud.
4. Importance of ensuring data subjects rights, such as the right to privacy, the right information and the right to correct data and rebut false assumption.
5. Access to law enforcement to data stored: only for specific purpose and subject to oversight.
6. Individual assessment of each case, particularly when algorithms are supporting decisions.
7. Data sharing with third countries: do not jeopardise asylum seekers safety



- ✓ FRA- Eurodac SCG leaflet, [Right to information when taking fingerprints for Eurodac](#), Jan. 2020
- ✓ FRA focus paper, [Facial recognition technology: fundamental rights considerations in the context of law enforcement](#), Nov. 2019
- ✓ FRA opinion, [The revised Visa Information System and its fundamental rights implications](#), Sept. 2018.
- ✓ FRA Opinion on [Fundamental rights implications of storing biometric data in identity documents and residence cards](#), Sept. 2018
- ✓ FRA [legal opinion on proposed Interoperability Regulations](#), April 2018.
- ✓ FRA report, [Under watchful eyes – biometrics, EU IT-systems and fundamental rights](#), March 2018
- ✓ FRA [opinion on the proposed ETIAS regulation](#), June 2017
- ✓ FRA [survey](#) on travellers' perceptions 'eu-LISA Smart Borders Pilot' (2015)
- ✓ More [here](#)





Thank you for your attention!

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